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Without Supporting Statistical Evidence, Where Would Reported 
Measures of Substantive Importance Lead? To No Good Effect 
 
               Anthony J. Onwuegbuzie                  Joel R. Levin 




Although estimating substantive importance (in the form of reporting effect sizes) has recently received 
widespread endorsement, its use has not been subjected to the same degree of scrutiny as has statistical 
hypothesis testing. As such, many researchers do not seem to be aware that certain of the same criticisms 
launched against the latter can also be aimed at the former. Our purpose here is to highlight major concerns 
about effect sizes and their estimation. In so doing, we argue that effect size measures per se are not the 
hoped-for panaceas for interpreting empirical research findings. Further, we contend that if effect sizes were 
the only basis for interpreting statistical data, social-science research would not be in any better position than 
it would if statistical hypothesis testing were the only basis. We recommend that hypothesis testing and 
effect-size estimation be used in tandem to establish a reported outcome’s believability and magnitude, 
respectively, with hypothesis testing (or some other inferential statistical procedure) retained as a 
“gatekeeper” for determining whether or not effect sizes should be interpreted. Other methods for addressing 
statistical and substantive significance are advocated, particularly confidence intervals and independent 
replications. 
 





Statistical hypothesis testing has been 
implemented to assess the believability, or non-
“chanceness” (Levin, 1998b; Levin & Robinson, 
1999), of research findings for more than 75 years, 
stemming from the seminal works of Fisher 
(1925/1941) and Neyman and Pearson (1928). 
Despite the widespread use of hypothesis testing 
during most of the last century through today, its 
practice has been controversial. Indeed, over the 
past few decades testing for statistical significance 
has come under close scrutiny. 
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Since 1950, for example, the number of 
articles published in the fields of education, 
psychology, ecology, and medicine criticizing 
hypothesis testing has been increasing at an 
exponential rate (Anderson, Burnham, & 
Thompson, 2000). Additionally: 
 
(a) professional journals (e.g., The Journal of 
Experimental Education and Research in the 
Schools) have devoted special theme issues to 
statistical hypothesis testing; and 
 
(b) symposia have been held at national annual 
meetings , such as the American Educational 
Research Association, the American Psychological 
Association, and the American Psychological 
Society. Even an edited book, What if there were 
no significance tests? (Harlow, Mulaik, & Steiger, 
1997), has been devoted exclusively to the topic. 
 
The Case Against Statistical Hypothesis Testing 
 Some of the staunchest critics of statistical 
hypothesis testing contend that this practice has 
been extremely harmful to scientific progress in 
the social sciences. For example, Meehl (1978, p. 
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817) stated that it “is a terrible mistake, a basically 
unsound, poor scientific strategy, and one of the 
worst things that ever happened in the history of 
psychology.” Rozeboom (1997) continued: 
 
Null-hypothesis significance 
testing is surely the most bone-
headedly misguided procedure 
ever institutionalized in the rote 
training of science students...[I]t is 
a sociology-of-science 
wonderment that this statistical 
practice has remained so 
unresponsive to criticism. (p. 335) 
 
Similarly, Tryon (1998) complained: 
 
[T]he fact that statistical experts 
and investigators publishing in the 
best journals cannot consistently 
interpret the results of these 
analyses is extremely disturbing. 
Seventy-two years of education 
have resulted in minuscule, if any, 
progress toward correcting this 
situation. It is difficult to estimate 
the handicap that widespread, 
incorrect, and intractable use of a 
primary data analytic method has 
on a scientific discipline, but the 
deleterious effects are 
undoubtedly substantial. (p. 796) 
 
Schmidt and Hunter (1997, p. 37) claimed that 
“[s]tatistical significance testing retards the growth 
of scientific knowledge; it never makes a positive 
contribution,” and Thompson (1992b, p. 436) 
added: “[Statistical significance testing] has 
created considerable damage as regards the 
cumulation of knowledge.” 
 As a result of the purported flaws that 
statistical hypothesis testing has been accused of, 
several researchers have recommended that it be 
banned completely (e.g., Bakan, 1966; Cahan, 
2000; Carver, 1978, 1993; Cohen, 1994; Guttman, 
1985; Loftus, 1996; Meehl, 1967, 1978; Nix & 
Barnette, 1998; Rozeboom, 1960; Schmidt, 1992; 
1996; Schmidt & Hunter, 1997). Although we: (a) 
agree that statistical hypothesis testing has been 
misused, and (b) concur with many of the 
criticisms of it that have been offered, it is quite a 
leap to charge that hypothesis testing by itself has 
stunted “the cumulation of knowledge” 
(Thompson, 1992b, p. 436), is “one of the worst 
things that ever happened in the history of 
psychology” (Meehl, 1978, p. 817), or “retards the 
growth of scientific knowledge... [and]... never 
makes a positive contribution” (Schmidt & 
Hunter, 1997, p. 37). 
 Furthermore, some of the assertions made 
in an attempt to invalidate the hypothesis-testing 
practice either have been accompanied by 
unsubstantiated claims or represent flawed logic. 
As noted by Krantz (1999): 
 
It is one thing to accuse scientists 
of showing their ignorance of 
statistical reasoning in the course 
of their science, but this does not 
imply that their ultimate 
conclusions will be incorrect, nor 
even that their efficiency in 
reaching correct conclusions will 
be impaired. A causal attribution 
of this sort needs to be supported 
by careful empirical arguments. 
(p. 1378) 
 
 The foregoing concerns aside, valid 
criticisms of statistical hypothesis testing have 
nonetheless been made. Fan (2001) provided a 
summary of some of these criticisms: 
 
Thompson (1993) discussed three 
relevant criticisms for (sic.) 
statistical significance testing: (a) 
overdependency on sample size, 
(b) some nonsensical 
comparisons, and (c) some 
inescapable dilemmas created by 
statistical significance testing 
(e.g., testing for assumption vs. 
testing for the research 
hypothesis). In a similar vein, 
Kirk (1996) discussed three major 
criticisms of statistical 
significance testing: (a) 
Significance testing does not tell 
researchers what they want to 
know, but rather, it creates the 
illusion of probabilistic proof by 
contradiction (Falk & Greenbaum, 
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1995). (b) Statistical signif icance 
testing is often a trivial exercise 
because it simply indicates the 
power of the design (which 
primarily depends on the sample 
size) to reject the false null 
hypothesis. (c) Significance 
testing “turns a continuum of 
uncertainty into a dichotomous 
reject-do-not-reject decision,” and 
this dichotomous decision process 
may “lead to the anomalous 
situation in which two researchers 
obtain identical treatment effects 
but draw different conclusions” 
(Kirk, p. 748) because of the 
slight differences in their design 
(e.g., sample sizes). (p. 276) 
 
 Because of these and other concerns, 
many researchers have called for the reporting of 
measures of practical significance (or substantive 
importance, as reflected by effect size or strength 
of relationship indices), either in addition to or 
instead of testing for statistical significance. 
Indeed, the most recent edition of the influential 
Publication Manual of the American 
Psychological Association (2001) states: 
 
The general principle to be 
followed...is to provide the reader 
not only with information about 
statistical significance but also 
with enough information to assess 
the magnitude of the observed 
effect or relationship. (p. 26) 
 
Certain anti-hypothesis-testers (e.g., Carver, 1993) 
even go so far as to endorse effect-size estimates 
as replacements for statistical significance testing 
– that is, they contend that effect sizes are all that 
are needed to make inferences about empirical 
research outcomes. As is argued throughout the 
remainder of this manuscript, however, we believe 
that such practice would only lead to no good 
effect! 
 Debates about the value and warrants of 
statistical hypothesis testing can be traced back to 
Boring (1919) and Berkson (1938, 1942). Over the 
last decade, many researchers have seemingly 
jumped on the effect-size bandwagon without 
scrutinizing its use to the same degree as has 
occurred for hypothesis testing. Moreover, what 
appears to have been lost in all this fervor for 
effect-size provision – and as we illustrate later – 
is that many of the same criticisms launched 
against statistical hypothesis testing can also be 
aimed at effect sizes. As one salient illustration, 
cautions concerning hypothesis testing and its 
interpretation can be found in such sources as the 
aforementioned APA Publication Manual (2001) 
– namely, that p-values (statistical significance 
probabilities) do not directly reflect “the 
magnitude of an effect or the strength of a 
relationship” (p. 25). Yet, no such cautions about 
effect-size measures are found in that pivotal 
reference source. 
 
Concerns and Cautions About Effect Sizes 
 In what follows we highlight several 
major concerns about effect sizes and their 
estimation, in what might be called nine effect-size 
nuisances and no-no’s. In doing so, we consider 
several rarely acknowledged limitations of effect-
size measures. We (as others before us) argue that 
effect-size measures are influenced by, and 
therefore must be interpreted with respect to, a 
number of critical factors. As a preliminary 
comment, we regard certain of these 
considerations as being especially relevant when 
effect sizes are reported as sole indicators of an 
empirical study’s significance (i. e., as reflected in 
Carver’s, 1993, “effect-size only” recom-
mendation). We return to this fundamental issue in 
a later section. 
 According to Wilkinson and the Task 
Force on Statistical Inference (1999, p. 599) 
“[R]eporting and interpreting effect sizes...is 
essential to good research.” Unfortunately, this 
statement might suggest to some that the provision 
of effect sizes necessarily improves the quality of 
empirical studies. Yet, the uncritical acceptance of 
effect size measures is problematic because, as is 
now discussed, such measures are sensitive to a 
number of factors, such as: the research objective; 
sampling design (including the levels of the 
independent variable, choice of treatment 
alternatives, and statistical analysis employed); 
sample size and variability; type and range of the 
measures used; and score reliability (see, for 
example, Fern & Monroe, 1996; Frick, 1995; 
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O’Grady, 1982; Olejnik & Algina, 2000; and 
Sechrest & Yeaton, 1982). 
 1. The research objective. According to 
Fern and Monroe (1996), one’s interpretation of an 
effect size should vary, depending on whether the 
objective of the study is what they call theory 
application or effects application. In theory-
application research (or explanatory studies) the 
goal is to identify theories that increase our 
understanding of phenomena. Studies involving 
theory application, which consist primarily of 
theory generation and theory testing, typically 
focus on generalizing theories beyond the 
underlying sample and/or context. More 
specifically, in explanatory studies, the goal is to 
determine the “shape or functional nature of a 
relationship” (O’Grady, 1982, p. 770). 
 In such investigations, a large effect size is 
not necessarily of interest. Indeed, a large effect 
may be viewed as a negative outcome if it was not 
predicted by theory. That is, in theory-application 
research, a small effect may be more informative 
and useful than a large effect (Calder, Phillips, & 
Tybout, 1981). In fact, using “large” effect-size 
guidelines (e.g., Cohen, 1988) as the criterion for 
choosing among several independent variables in 
explanatory studies may culminate in misleading 
final theoretical models being selected. 
Conversely, in effects-application research (or 
predictive studies), researchers usually are not 
interested in generalizing the results beyond the 
levels of the variables selected. That is, in effects-
application studies, the interest is more on the size 
of the effect than on determining the 
generalizability of a particular theory. This 
suggests that effect sizes should not be interpreted 
without taking into account whether one’s research 
objective is essentially explanatory or predictive in 
nature.  
 2. Choice of a specific research design 
and experimental conditions. The selected 
research design also affects interpretation of effect 
sizes. Specifically, because within-subject 
sampling designs typically are more efficient than 
are between-subject sampling designs – inasmuch 
as they tend to minimize error variance (Maxwell 
& Delaney, 1990) – they tend to yield larger effect 
sizes (Keppel, 1991; O’Grady, 1982). Therefore, 
in interpreting effect sizes, consideration should be 
given to the sampling design used. 
 Although experimental studies allow the 
strongest causal inferences to be made and 
typically result in relatively smaller error variance 
in comparison to correlational studies, 
experimental designs also tend to yield smaller 
effect sizes than do correlational designs. This is 
because in experimental research the independent 
variable is artificially created specifically for the 
study and thus is weaker than it is in the 
population (Kerlinger, 1973). As such, comparing 
effect sizes stemming from experimental studies 
and those generated from correlational studies 
easily can be the equivalent of comparing apples 
and oranges. Moreover, in fixed-effects models, 
the magnitude of the omnibus effect size depends 
on the specific levels of the variables of interest. If 
different levels of the independent variable are 
studied, the effect sizes are not comparable 
(Oljenik & Algina, 2000).  
 Further, the number of experimental 
conditions (or levels of the independent variable) 
used in a study can either increase or decrease the 
effect size. O’Grady (1982, p. 773) provides a 
striking example of a two-conditions study 
(yielding M1 = 10 and M2 = 18, with common SDs 
of 2 and ns of 10) in which the proportion of 
variance accounted for by the treatment factor 
(sample 02) is .82. Yet, had the same two 
conditions been part of a study that also included 
three additional experimental conditions, whose 
resulting means ranged in equal increments 
between the two original means (i.e., M3 = 12, M4 
= 14, and M5 = 16), with the same SDs and ns as 
before, the proportion of variance accounted for by 
the treatment factor is reduced to .69. Of course, 
had the proportion of variance associated with just 
the two focal conditions been calculated and 
reported (i.e., the sample 02 associated with the 
Treatment 1 vs. Treatment 2 contrast), it would be 
equal to the original .82. 
 Interpretive problems resulting from 
omnibus, as opposed to contrast, strength-of-
relationship reporting were pointed out by Levin 
(1967). Such problems can be further illustrated by 
another hypothetical example, which represents 
the “flip side” of the one just presented. Suppose 
that a researcher compares two different 
experimental treatments and finds that M1 = 16 
and M2 = 17, with common SDs of 2.5 and ns of 8. 
Here, the sample 02 can be found to be a fairly 
“small” .04. However, had these two treatments 
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been part of a study that included a low-scoring 
“control” group (M3 = 6) with the same SD and n 
as in the other two conditions, now the sample 02 
would be found to leap to an “impressive” .81. As 
long as the researcher focused on the Treatment 1 
vs. Treatment 2 contrast (for which 02 = .04), the 
same conclusion about a “small” treatment 
difference would have been reached as before. 
Unfortunately, however, many researchers 
routinely report and interpret the omnibus measure 
(here, 02 = .81), to the detriment of the 
unquestioning consumer. In multifactor designs a 
similar opportunity arises for misleading the 
consumer – namely, by not recognizing Kirk’s 
(1995, p. 261) distinction between omnibus and 
partial strength-of-relationship measures. 
 The design of an experimental study also 
refers to the manner in which participants are 
assigned to experimental conditions and 
treatments administered (generally characterized 
as between-subjects designs, within-subjects 
designs, mixed designs, blocking designs, and 
hierarchical designs), whether or not concomitant 
variables (covariates) are included, and the 
statistical analyses employed. Effect-size measures 
are affected by all such factors in a design, 
compromising comparisons of effect sizes across 
studies that differ in their specifics (Oljenik & 
Algina, 2000). 
 In particular, when one or more factors in 
a comparison-of-means analysis represents an 
individual difference factor (e.g., a covariate or 
blocking variable), problems arise with respect to 
what to use as the standardizer in an effect-size 
index. For example, in a two-factor design in 
which one factor is a manipulated factor and the 
other an individual difference factor, it is often a 
matter of debate whether the standardizer should 
be computed by ignoring or controlling for the 
individual difference factor (Oljenik & Algina, 
2000). Whichever approach is taken leads to a 
different effect size being computed and, 
therefore, effect sizes using these two different 
standardizers are not comparable. In fact, as noted 
by Oljenik and Algina (2000): “depending on the 
sample size and effect sizes associated with the 
individual difference and interaction factors in a 
two-factor design, the effect size estimated for the 
manipulated factor can vary from trivial to quite 
large” (p. 250). 
 The difference in effect sizes is even 
greater if the individual difference factors vary 
across studies. Because varying standardizers for 
computing effect sizes are used in different 
studies, researchers should compare effect sizes 
only if they are completely aware of the 
standardizer that was used in each study of 
interest. Unfortunately, most researchers do not 
specify which standardizer was used in their 
effect-size computation. This discussion should 
make it clear that a researcher can make an effect 
size look larger or smaller by defining an effect 
size in terms of the specific design and control-
variable characteristics just mentioned – basically, 
by incorporating (or not) any design features that 
serve to affect the error variance – and which may 
have ethical implications as well. 
 3. Selection of an effect-size measure. We 
now turn our attention to another potentially 
ethically sensitive effect-size issue. Although there 
is general agreement that the provision of effect-
size information is valuable, recommendations 
concerning the specific measure that should be 
reported for a particular study are typically absent. 
In our view, such recommendations are critical, 
for as one of us noted previously: 
 
Which of, say, half a dozen 
different effect-size measures that 
could be summoned up for a given 
problem should a researcher 
report? The one that is most 
informative, the one that is most 
conservative, or the one that 
enhances the researcher’s case and 
misleads the unsuspecting reader? 
For example, researchers might 
report percent agreement 
measures or percentages of 
variance accounted for that have 
not been corrected for chance, or 
researchers might seek out a 
goodness-of-fit measure that 
places their data in the most 
favorable light. For dependent 
measures where a frame of 
reference is needed or helpful, 
providing scale -free (relative) 
effect sizes (e.g., Cohen’s d or 
percentages of variance accounted 
for) is not nearly as substantively 
STATISTICAL EVIDENCE AND SUBSTANTIVE IMPORTANCE 138 
interpretable as is providing the 
scale-dependent (absolute) 
measures in addition or 
instead...In many domains, not 
even knowledgeable statisticians 
agree on what the “best” or “most 
informative” effect-size measure 
actually is. (Levin & Robinson, 
1999, p. 151) 
 
 Levin (1998b, pp. 45-46) similarly 
provided the following hypothetical example of 
the perplexing situation that effect sizes can create 
for researchers, readers, and other interpreters of 
the importance of an empirical finding: 
 
Suppose that an investigator wants 
to help older adults remember an 
ordered set of ten important daily 
tasks that must be performed 
(insert and turn on a hearing aid, 
take certain pills, make a 
telephone call to a caregiver, etc.). 
In a sample of six elderly adults, 
three are randomly assigned to 
each of two experimental 
conditions. In one condition (A), 
no special task instruction is 
given; and in the other (B1), 
participants are instructed in the 
use of self-monitoring strategies. 
Following training, the 
participants are observed with 
respect to their success in 
performing the ten tasks...[T]he 
average number of tasks the 
participants correctly remembered 
to perform was 1.33 [SD = .577, 
raw scores = 1, 1, and 2] and 3.33 
[SD = .577, raw scores = 3, 3, and 
4] for the no-instruction (A) and 
self-monitoring (B1) conditions, 
respectively. For [these data], it 
can be determined that the 
“conditions” factor accounts for a 
hefty 82% of the total variation in 
task performance (i.e., the squared 
point-biserial correlation is .82, 
which for the two-sample case, is 
equivalent to the sample 02). 
Alternatively, the self-monitoring 
mean is 3-½ within-group 
standard deviations higher than 
the no-instruction mean (i.e., 
Cohen’s d is 3.5). From either 
effect-size perspective (02 or d), 
certainly this represents an 
impressive treatment effect, 
doesn’t it? Or does it? 
 
Suppose that instead of self-
monitoring training, participants 
were taught how to employ 
“mnemonic” (systematic memory-
enhancing) techniques (B2) ...with 
the results [yielding a mean 
number correct of 7.67 (SD = 
2.517, raw scores = 5, 8, and 
10)]...[A] comparison with no-
instruction Condition A 
surprisingly reveals that once 
again, the conditions factor 
accounts for 82% of the total 
variation in task performance 
(equivalently, d again equals 3.5). 
Thus, when expressed in 
standardized/relative terms (either 
02 or d), the effect sizes associated 
with the two instructional 
conditions (B1 and B2) are exactly 
the same, and substantial in 
magnitude. Yet, when expressed 
in absolute terms and with respect 
to the task’s maximum, there are 
important differences in the 
“effects” of B1 and B2: Increasing 
participants’ average performance 
from 1.33 to 3.33 tasks 
remembered seems much less 
impressive than does increasing it 
from 1.33 to 7.67. Helping these 
adults remember an average of 
only 3 of their 10 critical tasks 
might be regarded as a dismal 
failure, whereas helping them 
remember an average of almost 8 
out of 10 tasks would be a 
stunning accomplishment. Yet, 
the conventional effect-size 
measures are the same in each 
case. 
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 To help shed light on this seeming 
paradoxical situation, Levin (1998b) pointed out:  
 
The major problem in this 
example arises from the 
conditions’ differing variabilities. 
That problem could be accounted 
for by defining alternative d-like 
effect-size measures based on just 
the control condition’s (Condition 
A’s) standard deviation... 
Interpreting effect sizes, in the 
absence of raw data, remains a 
problem for 02 and Cohen’s d, 
however. (p. 53) 
 
 Insofar as different effect-size measures 
are suitable for different types of data (e.g., 
Hogarty & Kromrey, 2001), it is surprising that 
some researchers do not even indicate the index to 
which they are referring when reporting effect 
sizes (Kirk, 1996). Neither do researchers appear 
to indicate whether the effect-size measure 
interpreted represents an adjusted or unadjusted 
index. The lack of information provided is 
disturbing because meta-analyses involve 
aggregating and comparing effect sizes across 
studies. How can effect sizes be aggregated if it is 
not clear whether they are based on the same type 
of index? Unfortunately, the practice of some 
meta-analysts to omit unlabeled effect sizes from 
the aggregate index introduces bias. 
 4. Varying, and generally arbitrary, 
guidelines for interpreting effect-size magnitudes. 
As was noted earlier, a way in which statistical 
hypothesis testing is abused occurs when a 
dichotomous decision (i.e., reject vs. do not reject) 
comprises the sole determinant of the significance 
(read importance) of an observed outcome. This is 
done by comparing the outcome’s significance 
probability (p-value) to some predetermined 
standard significance level (" level), such as .05. 
Yet, many researchers who interpret effect sizes 
appear to use equally rigid categorical criteria such 
as those provided by Cohen (1988), who 
popularized the use of effect-size reporting. This 
occurs even though recommendations vary with 
respect to how effect sizes should be interpreted 
(McLean, O’Neal, & Barnette, 2000) and despite 
Cohen’s (1988) admonishment that effect-size 
values are dependent on the specific content and 
methods that prevail in a given research context. 
 For example, in interpreting effect sizes 
associated with differences between two groups 
(i.e., Cohen’s d), Cohen (1988) recommended 
demarcations of .20 for small effects, .50 for 
medium effects, and .80 for large effects. In stark 
contrast, McLean (1995) suggested the following 
criteria: .50 for small effects, between .50 and 1.00 
for moderate effects, and above 1.00 for large 
effects. Regardless of which criteria are used, it is 
clear that adherence to such cutpoints has the 
effect of trichotomizing interpretations in much 
the same way as p-values dichotomize statistical 
decision making. As noted by Shaver (1993): 
“There already is a tendency to use criteria, such 
as Cohen’s (1988) standards for small, medium, 
and large effect sizes, as mindlessly as has been 
the practice with the .05 criterion in statistical 
significance testing” (p. 311). Similarly, 
Thompson (2001) stated: “If people interpreted 
effect sizes [using fixed benchmarks] with the 
same rigidity that " = .05 has been used in 
statistical testing, we would merely be being 
stupid in another metric” (p. 82-83). 
 In addition, blending the previous concern 
(different effect-size measures may lead to 
different conclusions) with the present one (effect-
size descriptors are arbitrary and vary by context) 
we consider the following confusing/conflicting 
medical-study conclusion presented by Rosenthal 
and DiMatteo (2001). The results of a study 
designed to examine the effect of taking aspirin on 
heart-attack prevention (Steering Committee of the 
Physicians’ Health Study Research Group, 1988) 
yielded what is typically regarded as a tiny 
Pearson r of .034. Yet, when the same outcome is 
interpreted from the perspective of Rosenthal and 
Rubin’s (1982) binomial effect size display 
(BESD), the “finding is, in fact, very important 
and translates into substantial reductions in 
morbidity and mortality” (Rosenthal & DiMatteo, 
2001, p. 78). For related discussion on the 
potential importance of conventionally small 
effect sizes, see Prentice and Miller (1992). 
 5. Sample size and sampling variability . 
The interpretation of effect sizes also varies as a 
function of sample size. Studies with smaller 
sample sizes often result in effect sizes being 
overestimated, whereas investigations with large 
sample sizes tend to lead to effect sizes being 
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underestimated (Bakan, 1966; Fern & Monroe, 
1996; Hedges & Olkin, 1985). Empirically, 
Barnette and McLean (1999) demonstrated that 
standardized effect-size variation is systematic 
rather than random. In their Monte Carlo 
investigation, these authors found that the number 
of groups and sample sizes were almost perfectly  
predictive (i.e., R2 = .999) of standardized effect 
sizes. Thus, comparing effect sizes across studies 
with very different sample sizes can be 
misleading.  
 One of the most repeated criticisms of 
statistical hypothesis testing is its over-reliance on 
sample size (Cohen, 1994; Fan, 2001; Kirk, 1996; 
Onwuegbuzie & Daniel, 2003, in press; Schmidt 
& Hunter, 1997; Thompson, 1993). Yet, as was 
noted recently by Fan (2001): “effect size can also 
be misleading because sample size influences the 
sampling variability of an effect-size measure” (p. 
275). Using Monte Carlo methods, Fan 
demonstrated that an observed finding that appears 
to have practical significance (i.e., a large effect 
size) actually could be the result of sampling error, 
thereby making any resultant conclusions 
unreliable and potentially misleading – which 
lends empirical support to a major facet of the 
argument promoted by Levin and Robinson (2000; 
see also Sawilowsky & Yoon, 2002), summarized 
later. Fan (2001) recommended that information 
about both statistical significance and effect sizes 
be reported for observed findings: 
 
Statistical significance testing and 
effect size are two related sides 
that together make a coin; they 
complement each other but do not 
substitute for one another. Good 
research practice requires that, for 
making sound quantitative 
decisions in educational research, 
both sides should be considered. 
(p. 275) 
 
 It should come as no surprise that effect 
sizes are affected by sample size in much the same 
way as are p-values. Indeed, effect-size statistics 
represent random variables. Consequently, effect-
size measures are affected by sampling variability, 
as dictated by its underlying sampling distribution. 
In turn, the amount of sampling variability of an 
effect-size estimate is influenced by the underlying 
sample size, in much the same way that p-values 
are affected by the number of cases utilized in the 
study. When the sample size is small, the 
discrepancy between the sample effect size and 
population effect size is larger (i.e., large bias) 
than when the sample size is large. Also, effect 
sizes are affected by nonrandom sampling, a 
condition that applies to the vast majority of 
empirical studies in education and psychology. 
Thus, solutions to compensate for the problems 
stemming from the role of sample size in statistical 
hypothesis testing (e.g., use of confidence 
intervals) should also apply to effect sizes. 
 A valid criticism of hypothesis testing that 
is supported by data pertains to the low statistical 
power that prevails in many studies. Indeed, the 
average power of null hypothesis significance tests 
typically ranges from .40 to .60 in empirical 
studies (Cohen, 1962, 1965, 1988, 1994; Schmidt, 
1996; Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer, 1989). With an 
estimated mean across-study power of .50 (Cohen, 
1962, 1997), Schmidt and Hunter (1997) decry 
that “[t]his level of accuracy is so low that it could 
be achieved just by flipping a (unbiased) coin!” (p. 
40). Yet, the finding that power is unacceptably 
low in most studies indicates to us that 
researchers’ application of statistical hypothesis 
testing, rather than its logic, is to blame. Indeed, it 
can be argued that low statistical power represents 
more of a research design issue than a statistical 
issue, since acceptable power can be rectified by 
incorporating a larger sample. 
 Unfortunately, as was discussed earlier, 
effect sizes also can fall victim to poor research 
designs, in general, and to small sample sizes, in 
particular. In fact, an obsession with effect sizes 
without considering the associated sample sizes 
can have the effect of promoting weak research 
designs. As such, in making decisions about which 
articles should be published, journal editors should 
focus less on p-values and effect sizes and more 
on the quality of the underlying research design 
(for related discussion and references, see Levin, 
1998b, p. 45). 
 6. Distribution nonnormality. Although 
this may surprise or disturb some readers, many of 
the commonly used effect-size measures rely 
heavily on the parametric hypothesis-testing 
assumptions of normality and homogeneity of 
variance (see, for example, Fan, 2001, Barnette & 
McLean, 1999, and Hogarty & Kromrey, 2001). 
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The numerator of common effect-size measures 
involves means and mean differences, which are 
sensitive to extreme observations, especially when 
sample sizes are small (Huck, 2000). In the small-
sample case, an extreme observation in one of the 
conditions (e.g., the experimental group) can 
seriously distort the true mean difference, thereby 
unduly inf luencing the effect-size estimate. Just as 
outlying observations affect the t-statistic and 
associated p-values (statistical significance), in the 
independent-samples test of means they also 
influence the effect size (practical significance). 
For this reason, nonparametric effect-size 
measures have been developed and considered. 
 Applyng Monte Carlo methods, Hogarty 
and Kromrey (2001) demonstrated that the most 
frequently used effect-size estimates (e.g., Cohen’s 
d and Hedges & Olkin’s g) are sensitive to 
departures from normality and variance 
homogeneity (discussed next). Even trimmed 
effect-size measures (Hedges & Olkin, 1985; 
Yuen, 1974) exhibit bias when sample sizes are 
small, as do several nonparametric effect-size 
indices, including Y1 (Kraemer & Andrews, 1982) 
and the Common Language (CL) effect-size 
statistic (McGraw & Wong, 1992).  
 7. Score variability (both between and 
within samples). Other characteristics of the 
sample also affect interpretation of effect sizes. In 
particular, the more heterogeneous the sample is 
with respect to the variable of interest, the greater 
the effect size typically tends to be. This is the 
case for both explanatory and predictive studies 
(O’Grady, 1982). Moreover, homogeneous 
samples, which more often arise from convenience 
sampling, can result in range restriction and, 
subsequently, attenuate effect sizes (Pedhazur & 
Schmelkin, 1991). Recognition of this 
complicating situation can be seen in a recent 
critique of a report challenging the effectiveness of 
teacher education programs by Darling-Hammond 
and Youngs (2002): 
 
The effect size also depends on 
other context factors, such as the 
range of variability in the measure 
used, which can change in 
different locations and time 
periods. For example, in some 
eras and in some locations 
virtually all teachers held content 
degrees or were fully certified, so 
these variables do not strongly 
predict variations in outcomes. 
When much more variability is 
present, these variables are 
strongly predictive of outcomes. 
Thus, several studies have found 
strong measured influences of 
certification status on student 
achievement in states like 
California and Texas during the 
1990s when there were wide 
differences in teachers’ 
qualifications. (p. 15) 
 
It is also possible for variance heterogeneity to 
reduce the effect size. This can be the case when 
the sample is too diverse and the heterogeneity 
increases error variance, thereby attenuating the 
effect size (Lesser, 1959). 
 Regardless of whether the effect size is 
increased or decreased by heterogeneous samples, 
interpreting effect sizes that arise from samples 
with different degrees of heterogeneity is 
inadvisable. In particular, researchers should 
exercise caution in comparing effect sizes across 
convenience samples. In fact, Daniel and 
Onwuegbuzie (2000) refer to sampling bias error 
that results in inconsistency of results across 
studies as a Type IX error. According to these 
authors, this type of error relates to “disparities in 
results generated from numerous convenience 
samples across a multiplicity of similar studies” 
(p. 23). 
 Further, because the denominator of 
common effect-size measures incorporates the 
pooled within-conditions variance, heterogeneity 
of variance affects effect-size estimation similarly 
to the way that it affects statistical hypothesis 
testing (and confidence-interval building - as was 
seen in Levin, 1998b, p. 53). Moreover, the 
problems caused by departures from normality and 
heterogeneity of variance when statistical 
significance testing is involved are very much an 
issue for effect-size measures associated with 
more complex family members of the general 
linear model. For example, the standard effect-size 
indices (e.g., 02, ,2, and T2) that are often 
calculated for OVA-type analyses (e.g., ANOVA, 
ANCOVA, MANOVA) assume equal variances – 
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an assumption that is not always met 
(Onwuegbuzie & Daniel, 2003). 
 However, these weaknesses do not imply 
that effect sizes should be banned or replaced by 
some other sort of index, echoing what some 
researchers (e.g., Carver, 1993) recommend 
should be the fate of statistical significance testing. 
Indeed, in cases where such violations come to the 
fore, nonparametric effect sizes (e.g., Y1 and CL) 
may be more appropriate, in much the same way 
that nonparametric inferential statistics often are 
more appropriate when the parametric 
assumptions are violated. The above limitations 
pertaining to effect sizes identified above suggest 
that: (a) assumptions underlying the selected 
effect-size method should be subjected to the same 
stringent scrutiny as are statistical significance 
tests; (b) combining statistical significance testing 
and effect-size indices, after checking all pertinent 
assumptions, provides an additional safety net 
from false or misleading conclusions, compared to 
using either technique alone; and (c) researchers 
should pay much more attention to maximizing the 
quality of their research designs (e.g., by selecting 
an appropriate or optimal sample size) in order to 
minimize threats to the model assumptions that 
pertain to both the statistical test and the 
accompanying effect-size measure of interest. 
 8. Reliability of the outcome measure 
(measurement error). Reliability is a concept that 
receives disproportionately scant attention in the 
interpretation of an observed finding 
(Onwuegbuzie & Daniel, 2000, 2001, 2003, in 
press; Onwuegbuzie, Daniel, & Roberts, in press; 
Roberts & Onwuegbuzie, 2003; Roberts, 
Onwuegbuzie, & Eby, 2001; Onwuegbuzie & 
Weems, in press; Weems & Onwuegbuzie, 2001). 
Reliability (or more precisely, unreliability) can 
adversely affect the internal validity of findings 
via “instrumentation” problems (e.g., Campbell & 
Stanley, 1963; Onwuegbuzie, 2003), through a 
reduction in statistical power. Specifically, 
Onwuegbuzie and Daniel (in press) demonstrated 
that subgroups with scores that generate markedly 
different reliability estimates can seriously reduce 
statistical power, even when the full-sample (i.e., 
across-groups) reliability coefficient is adequate. 
 Importantly, however, low reliability 
indices adversely affect not just statistical 
hypothesis testing; they also negatively impact 
effect-size measures. After all, low reliability 
coefficients stem from scores that do not behave in 
a consistent manner (Onwuegbuzie & Daniel, 
2000, 2001) and it is these scores that are used to 
calculate both inferential test statistics and effect-
size measures. Thus, effect-size measures are 
subject to the same limitations stemming from 
inadequate reliability as are p-values. Indeed, 
effect sizes should always be interpreted with 
respect to the reliability of the outcome measure, 
just as has been recommended for statistical 
hypothesis testing.  
 Specifically, there is an inverse 
relationship between the reliability of any of the 
variables of interest (whether the independent or 
dependent variable) and the corresponding effect 
size. In fact, such reliability provides an upper 
bound for the effect size (Lord & Novick, 1968; 
Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). Because a study’s 
reliability is a function of the study’s obtained 
scores rather than a priori test norms 
(Onwuegbuzie & Daniel, 2000, 2002a, 2002b; 
Thompson & Vacha-Haase, 2000; Vacha-Haase, 
Kogan, & Thompson, 2000; Wilkinson & Task 
Force on Statistical Inference, 1999), effect sizes 
should not be compared across studies without 
taking into account the individual studies’ 
outcome-measure reliabilities. For further 
discussion of reliability and effect size in both 
correlational and experimental study contexts, see 
O’Grady (1982, pp. 767-770). 
 9. Scale of measurement. The type and 
range of measure used can affect the size of the 
effect. It is not unusual for researchers studying a 
phenomenon to use different measures. In 
particular, in a study of an affective variable, 
whereas one researcher might use a Likert-type 
scale, another researcher might employ a rating 
scale. Still another researcher might employ a 
semantic differential scale or a Thurstone or 
Guttman scale. Similarly, in an investigation of a 
cognitive outcome, whereas one researcher might 
administer a multiple -choice test, another 
researcher might administer some other type of 
closed-ended instrument (e.g., true-false, 
matching), and still another researcher might 
administer an open-ended measure such as an 
essay. 
 Although all of these measures yield 
scores that can be analyzed statistically, each type 
of scale might not be measuring exactly the same 
construct. For instance, multiple -choice and essay 
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examinations often target different levels of 
learning in Bloom’s taxonomy of cognitive 
objectives (Bloom, 1956). As such, the effect size 
likely would vary as a function of the type of 
measure used. Although this apples-and-oranges 
situation is typically offered as the primary 
rationale for meta-analytic effect-size 
combinations (e.g., Hunt, 1997; Rosenthal & 
DiMatteo, 2001), it rarely is recognized as a study-
comparison concern. 
 Even if scales with the same item format 
(e.g., a Likert-scale format) are used across 
studies, both the number/type of items and the 
number/type of response options employed can 
affect the size of the effect. With respect to the 
former, compared to their counterparts with more 
items, scales with a smaller number of items lead 
to restriction of range, thereby attenuating effect 
sizes. Similarly, the proportion of negatively 
worded and positively worded items can influence 
the effect size (Onwuegbuzie & Weems, in press; 
Weems & Onwuegbuzie, 2001). With regard to 
the latter, the number of response options also can 
influence the effect size. Specifically, a reduction 
in the number of response options attenuates the 
range of scores, which, in turn, may reduce the 
magnitude of the effect. 
 Similarly, and as was mentioned earlier, a 
restriction in the variability of one or more 
variables typically decreases the effect size. This 
holds for a study’s independent variables, as well 
as its outcome measures. As noted by 
Onwuegbuzie and Daniel (2003), lacking the 
realization that nearly all parametric analyses 
represent the general linear model, many analysts 
inappropriately categorize independent variables 
in nonexperimental research designs in order to 
perform analyses such as analysis of variance. 
Disturbingly, findings from such analyses are then 
used to make causal inferences, when all that has 
occurred is a discarding of relevant variance – see, 
for example Cliff (1987); Pedhazur (1982); 
Prosser (1990); and Thompson (1986, 1988, 
1992a). 
 Yet, categorizing a continuous variable 
has been found repeatedly to reduce the effect 
size. For instance, a median split of a continuous 
variable can reduce the observed correlation by 
20% (Cohen, 1983; Hunter & Schmidt, 1990) – 
see also Vargha, Rudas, Delaney, & Maxwell 
(1996). If the cutpoint used for splitting the 
continuous variable differs from the median, then 
the reduction in the relationship between the 
variables can be expected to be even larger (Fern 
& Monroe, 1996). 
 Moreover, as the number of categorized 
groups decreases, less variance in the dependent 
variable is accounted for by the categorical 
variable, compared to the continuous variable, and 
thus the effect size is attenuated (Peet, 1999). With 
regard to type of response options, the use of 
midpoint categories (e.g., neutral response 
options) has been found to affect both score 
reliability and effect size (Weems & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2001). Therefore, comparing effect 
sizes across studies using different types and 
formats of scales is questionable. 
 In addition, it does not appear to be 
obvious to some researchers that effect sizes are a 
function of the scale of measurement used. 
Evidence of this is provided by McLean et al. 
(2000), who demonstrated that “gain” effect sizes 
were different for the raw scores, scaled scores, 
and Normal Curve Equivalent (NCE) scores for 
students in Grades 4, 6, and 8 on a national norm-
referenced test. Specifically, as McLean et al. 
expected, the effect sizes for NCE scores were 
lower than those for raw and scaled scores. The 
researchers appropriately concluded that when 
effect sizes are computed, researchers should take 
into account the scale of measurement on which 
they are based. 
 
Summary 
 We have highlighted nine general 
concerns about effect-size indices. When 
researchers design their studies, they must make 
numerous decisions. Each of these decisions can 
affect the magnitude of the effect-size estimate. 
Unfortunately, the extent to which the effect-size 
index is influenced by the decisions is almost 
always unknown. This suggests that researchers 
are not justified in reflexively applying Cohen’s 
(1988) effect-size magnitude and adjectival 
guidelines across studies in different domains or 
across studies that have different research design 
and analytical factors. Even more importantly, 
because effect sizes vary as a function of research-
related factors, effect sizes should be compared 
only when all of these factors are comparable. 
Assessing the substantive significance of an 
observed finding based solely on the effect size 
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may be misleading and no more diagnostic than is 
a test of a statistical hypothesis (Fern & Monroe, 
1996). 
 This does not mean that effect sizes are 
useless. As noted by Fern and Monroe (1996), if 
the goal of the researcher is to determine the size 
of an effect given the unique combination of 
factors that underlie the data, then a computed 
measure of effect size is informative. On the other 
hand, effect sizes cannot be used as a meaningful 
basis for comparison across studies “unless the 
researcher understands what, if any, unique factors 
contributed to the effect-size estimate” (Fern & 
Monroe, 1996, p. 102). In any case, when 
reporting effect sizes, researchers should always 
specify as many design, analysis, and 
psychometric characteristics as possible to help 
subsequent researchers decide the extent to which 
they can compare their effect sizes with previous 
estimates. In other words, researchers should 
contextualize their effect sizes (i.e., they should 
interpret their effect sizes within study’s specific 
parameters).  
 Many researchers who criticize statistical 
hypothesis testing, in general, and those who 
advocate replacing p-values with effect size 
measures, in particular, fail to mention any of the 
limitations associated with effect-size reporting. 
Thus, methodologists who criticize hypothesis 
testing without also discussing the limitations of 
effect sizes are not providing a balanced analysis 
but are focusing on the bad practices that have 
traditionally been linked to the former approach. 
Unfortunately, the just-mentioned concerns about 
effect sizes typically are not mentioned by their 
advocates. In discussing the limitations, we argue 
that effect sizes are not the hoped-for panacea for 
empirical research in the social sciences. 
 Further, we contend that if only effect 
sizes were used to interpret statistical data, social-
science research would not be in any better 
position than it would if only statistical hypothesis 
testing were used in quantitative studies. In fact, in 
an effect-size-only world, we submit that social-
science research would be in a worse position, in 
that progress would be retarded (Thompson, 
1992b) to an even greater extent than that 
imagined by hypothesis-testing critic s, in that 
statistically “chance” findings would unjustifiably 
be promoted by researchers as “real.” We 
reconsider that unfortunate situation in the 
following concluding section. 
 
Toward a Détente 
 The effect-size flaws that we have 
reviewed support the assertion that statistical 
hypothesis testing and effect-size reporting should 
be used in combination. A logical, internally 
consistent, way of combining these two 
procedures is through Robinson and Levin’s 
(1997) two-step suggestion for analyzing 
empirical data – namely, that effect sizes are 
reported if and only if the observed finding is 
statistically significant. 
 That is, statistical hypothesis testing 
should serve as a gatekeeper, guarding against 
spurious effect-size estimation. As noted by 
Robinson and Levin (1997), the goal of these two 
complementary approaches is to prevent the over-
interpretation of seemingly impressive effect sizes 
“in the absence of formal assessments of their 
likelihood” (p. 23). We therefore recommend that 
statistical hypothesis testing and effect-size 
estimation be used in tandem to establish a 
reported outcome’s believability and magnitude, 
respectively. As such, tests of significance serve a 
valuable purpose in determining whether effect-
size measures should be ignored or reported, a 
position endorsed by Fan (2001), Levin (1993), 
Robinson and Levin (1997), Knapp and 
Sawilowsky (2001), and even – we think – Gliner, 
Leech, and Morgan (2002). 
 Let us take a moment to consider the last 
part of the foregoing sentence. We say “even” 
because Gliner et al.’s recommendation appeared 
in a journal whose editorial policy specifically 
calls for effect-size inclusions even in the absence 
of statistical confirmation: “Furthermore, authors 
are required to report and interpret magnitude-of-
effect measures in conjunction with every p value 
that is reported” (Journal of Experimental 
Education, 2002, p. 94). We say “we think” 
because Gliner et al. are internally inconsistent in 
their position about always reporting and 
interpreting effect sizes in their position. 
 For example, they agree with Levin and 
Robinson’s (2000) distinction between single -
study investigations and multiple -study syntheses: 
“Our opinion is that effect sizes should accompany 
all reported p values for possible future meta-
analytic use, but they should not be presented as 
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findings in a single study in the absence of 
statistical significance” (Gliner et al., 2000, p. 86). 
Yet, in the penultimate sentence of their article 
they write: “We also recommend reporting effect 
size for nonsignificant outcomes” (p. 91). 
Addressing this blanket effect-size reporting 
recommendation, one of us has pointed out 
previously: 
 
This practice is absurdly 
pseudoscientific and opens the 
door to encouraging researchers to 
make something of an outcome 
that may be nothing more than a 
“fluke,” a chance occurrence. 
Without an operationally 
replicable screening device such 
as statistical hypothesis testing, 
there is no way of separating the 
wheat (statistically “real” 
relationships or effects) from the 
chaff (statistically “chance” ones), 
where “real” and “chance” are 
anchored in reference to either 
conventional or researcher-
established risks or “confidence 
levels.”...In its extreme form, 
effect-size-only reporting 
degenerates to strong conclusions 
about differential treatment 
efficacy that are based on 
comparing a single score of one 
participant in one treatment 
condition with that of another 
participant in a different 
condition. (Levin, 1998b, p. 45) 
 
Moreover, in a recent survey of the editorial board 
members of four educational-research journals 
(Capraro & Capraro, 2003), the 97 respondents 
(estimated from the data provided) greeted the 
recommendation that their journals require effect-
size reporting with overwhelming indifference: On 
a 7-point Likert scale ranging from “very strongly 
disagree” to “very strongly agree” the mean rating 
was 4.26, t(96) = 1.33, p = .19, for testing the 
hypothesis that respondents’ mean ratings do not 
differ from the scale midpoint of 4. Given the 
study’s relatively large sample size, this 
nonrejection of the indifference hypothesis should 
be taken with more than a grain of salt. 
 One additional internal-inconsistency 
irony – or at least an example of journal non-
policing – is worth mentioning. In an article 
published by one of the present authors (Hwang & 
Levin, 2002) in the same issue of the Journal of 
Experimental Education that proclaims the above 
effect-size policy, effect sizes were not reported 
for every p-value included; nor were they reported 
for statistically nonsignificant outcomes. Yet, 
somehow, some way, the article was published 
anyway! And this is not an isolated event. 
 A colleague, Dan Robinson, has 
experienced effect-size nonenforcement with two 
of his articles that were published in the same 
journal (Katayama & Robinson, 2000; Robinson, 
Katayama, Dubois, & Devaney, 1998), a journal 
that has promoted its effect-size policy since 1997 
(D. H. Robinson, personal communication, 
January 13, 2003). As with Thompson’s (e.g., 
1996) argument in other contexts, perhaps JEE 
should be encouraged to take a closer look at its 
own editorial policy, for in that journal effect-size 
endorsement clearly does not translate into effect-
size enforcement. As an informative aside, the 
Journal of Experimental Education is apparently 
not alone in its effect-size non-enforcement 
practices for D. H. Robinson (personal 
communication, January 22, 2003) indicates a 
similar phenomenon with another effect-size 
mandated journal, Contemporary Educational 
Psychology. Out of 11 intervention experiments 
that he tallied for that journal in 2001, only two 
were accompanied by effect-size estimates. 
 Even those who contend that effect sizes 
should replace statistical significance testing (e.g., 
Carver, 1993; Schmidt, 1996) recommend the use 
of confidence intervals alongside effect sizes. A 
two-sided confidence interval, characterized by 
lower and upper bounds, identifies a probable 
range of magnitudes for the effect size (Abelson, 
1997). As such, confidence intervals can be used 
to estimate the range of the effect’s practical 
significance – for related discussion, see 
Onwuegbuzie (2001) and Thompson (2002). 
 Moreover, insofar as confidence intervals 
include all the information provided by statistical 
hypothesis tests, and more (Cohen, 1994; Levin, 
1998b; Serlin, 1993), constructing them allows 
researchers to conduct the corresponding 
hypothesis tests, if desired (Krantz, 1999). In that 
sense, then, the provision of an inferential 
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confidence interval (instead of a hypothesis test) 
has logical appeal because that approach kills two 
birds (statistical and practical significance) with 
one stone. So as not to confuse the issue, it should 
be made clear that the kind of confidence-interval 
approach we are endorsing is the single -interval 
procedure based on a pre-experimentally 
established Type I error probability, which is 
inferentially equivalent to applying a Neyman-
Pearson statistical test of hypothesis. This 
approach is fundamentally and logically different 
from that espoused by certain hypothesis-testing 
critics, which would have researchers 
simultaneously provide multiple confidence 
intervals (for either raw or standardized effects) 
based on different confidence levels, such as 99%, 
95%, 90%, 80%, etc. – see, for example, Schmidt 
& Hunter (1997) and Thompson (2002). 
 Alternatively, hypothesis testing per se 
can be substantially improved (strengthened) by 
applying it in forms that are more intelligent than 
the one that is currently practiced. Such more 
intelligent forms call for researchers to 
formulate/test more theoretically driven and 
precise hypotheses, to determine (through power 
calculations) optimal sample sizes to test those 
hypotheses, and to incorporate equivalence-testing 
procedures (e.g., Seaman & Serlin, 1998) for 
better establishing the truth of the null hypothesis 
(see, for example, Levin, 1998a, pp. 329-330). 
 At the same time, we contend that 
hypothesis tests, confidence intervals, and effect 
sizes do not go far enough in the way of 
maximizing a domain’s knowledge base. This can 
be accomplished only through independent 
replications of results (i.e., two or more 
independent studies yielding similar findings that 
produce statistically and substantively compatible 
outcomes). We believe that “a replication is worth 
a thousandth p value” (Levin, 1995), as well as its 
being worth more than a large effect size based on 
a single study. In contrast to Carver (1978), 
however, we do not believe that “replicated results 
should automatically make statistical significance 
unnecessary” (p. 393). Such independent 
replications not only will make “invaluable 
contributions to the cumulative knowledge in a 
given domain” (Robinson & Levin, 1997, p. 25) 





As was noted by Onwuegbuzie (2003), a primary 
objective of empirical research – especially 
research designed to posit causal relationships – is 
to collect and analyze data that help a researcher 
make inferences from the sample(s) to the 
underlying population, leading to meaningful 
conclusions in which as many rival explanations 
as possible are eliminated. This is the goal that 
drives both statistical hypothesis testing and 
effect-size reporting. The extant literature has 
documented the limitations of hypothesis testing, 
whereas in this paper we have illustrated that 
effect-size interpretation is not without its flaws. 
No single index by itself is the magic bullet for 
analyzing and interpreting data. Rather, using both 
methods in combination, or combining confidence 
intervals and effect sizes, helps to rule out more 
rival threats to statistical-conclusion validity 
(Cook & Campbell, 1979; Shadish, Cook & 
Campbell, 2002) than would occur if either 
method were used alone to interpret observed 
findings. At the same time, however, to minimize 
both statistical-conclusion validity and external 
validity threats there is no substitute for 
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